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Abstract
Pricing should speed up the substitution of low cost electronic payments for expensive
paper-based transactions and cash. But by how much? Norway has explicitly priced
individual payment transactions and rapidly shifted to electronic payments while the
Netherlands has experienced the same shift without direct pricing. Controlling for dif-
ferences between countries, we estimate the incremental eﬀect of pricing on the shift to
electronic payments. If users strongly value the improved convenience or security of
electronic payments, pricing—viewed negatively by most consumers—may not be necessary
to ensure rapid adoption of electronic payments.
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The production of electronic payments by banks typically cost from one-third to one-half
as much as its paper-based equivalent or cash (c.f., Humphrey, Willesson, Bergendahl, and
Lindblom, 2005). As well, merchants’ cost of accepting electronic payments over giro net-
works and at the point of sale are also lower (credit cards excepted). Since the resource cost
of a country’s payments system may account for 2% to 3% of its GDP, it is clear that shifting
from paper to electronic payments can confer social beneﬁts. Importantly, the discounted
value of these beneﬁts will be larger the more rapidly this shift occurs.
There is overwhelming evidence that consumers respond to price incentives but almost
no evidence of what this response may be in the payments area. Although consumers are
used to responding to price incentives, they tend not to welcome the opportunity to trade
oﬀ perceived payment preferences with relative prices when their payment use has commonly
been viewed as being “free.”1 While businesses typically pay directly for the payment services
they use via explicit transaction fees or compensating balances, consumers have traditionally
paid implicitly through lost ﬂoat or lower (or no) interest on transaction balances. In
addition, due to competitive reasons, banks fear a loss of deposit market share if they move
ﬁrst (and are perhaps the only one) to explicitly price consumer payment transactions while
anti-trust authorities would be suspicious of industry eﬀorts to coordinate such pricing.
One country—Norway—has overcome these diﬃculties by coordinating only the timing of
when direct pricing of consumer payments would start—not the level of prices to be charged
which could in fact be zero. The quid pro quo was an elimination of banks’ practice of
recouping payment costs through payment ﬂoat—debiting consumer accounts prior to a value
date for bill payments or delaying funds availability for credits to accounts—which made it
appear that payment use was “free.” The goal was to make payment costs more explicit
so consumers could match better the beneﬁts and costs of diﬀerent payment instruments, a
response expected to lower the social cost of their payment system.2
Our main purpose is to determine the eﬀect of diﬀerential transaction-based pricing of
payment instruments on the adoption rate of electronic payments. This is done by compar-
ing the shift to electronic payments in two countries—one that has pricing (Norway) and one
that does not (Netherlands). Transaction-based prices are key since they aﬀect consumers’
decisions about payment use whereas ﬁxed fees are sunk costs ex post that do not vary with
usage and thus have limited behavioral eﬀects. The implied discounted social beneﬁtt h a t
follows from a possibly more rapid substitution of low cost for high cost payment instru-
ments is also estimated. Data on payment instrument use for many developed countries is
available annually in various Bank for International Settlements and European Central Bank
documents, as well as from payment statistics by national central banks. As these time
series rarely exceed 15 years, a parsimonious model speciﬁcation is necessary. A comparable
time series of actual payment instrument prices on a broad range of payment instruments is
available only for Norway. We contrast the rapid adoption of electronic payments in Norway
over 1990-2004 with the experience of the Netherlands which also rapidly adopted electronic
1Surveys indicate that customers are sensitive to price increases of payment instruments and react accord-
ingly by switching to cheaper ones, see Humphrey, Kim and Vale (2001).
2Pricing in Norway was implemented by banks individually and encouraged by the central bank. The fact
that the larger banks were ﬁrst to introduce explicit pricing made it easier for the other banks to follow after
a lag. Bank eﬀorts to improve the payment system have also occurred in Canada (to eliminate the ﬂoat
incentive to use checks), Germany (to truncate checks and collect them electronically), and the Netherlands
(shifting from paper-based credit transfers to “straight-through-processed” direct debits).
2payments but did not impose per transaction prices on consumers. By applying a system
estimation to our model we are able to improve on the degrees of freedom and increase the
eﬃciency of our estimators.
If the incremental eﬀect of direct pricing is large, holding constant other within and cross-
country inﬂuences aﬀecting the adoption of electronic payments, then the potential social
beneﬁt can also be large. This would suggest that antitrust concerns raised by possible
bank coordination of the implementation of pricing (but not any coordination of the level of
prices being charged) could be oﬀset by subsequent social beneﬁts. It would also suggest,
in a revealed preference context, that consumers generally place a relatively low value on
the greater convenience and security oﬀered by electronic payments since, otherwise, pricing
would not have a large separate eﬀect on adoption rates. A ﬁnal consideration, but one
not discussed here, is the loss of seigniorage revenues to the government to the degree that
electronic payments replace cash at the point of sale.
In what follows, we show in Section 2 how the composition of payments has evolved in
Norway and the Netherlands along with the levels of relative prices in Norway. Transaction
prices for consumers are zero in the Netherlands.3 Our focus is on the substitution of
debit cards for cash (or cash and checks) at the point of sale along with the substitution
of (remote) electronic giro payments for paper-initiated giro transactions.4 In Section 3,
we specify a parsimonious point of sale “country diﬀerence” model to separate the eﬀect of
pricing debit card use and ATM cash withdrawals from diﬀerences in terminal availability
and real personal consumption in our two countries. A similar model relies primarily on
prices for the substitution of electronic versus paper-initiated giro payments (since terminal
availability is not a constraint). By using two countries we seek to eﬀectively “hold constant”
non-price attributes that can inﬂuence payment use in addition to pricing when the analysis
is applied to only a single country. Our set of four equations is estimated in Section 4 in
a seemingly unrelated regression framework to improve eﬃciency and the eﬀect of prices on
payment composition, including the implied price elasticities, are presented. Diﬀerent models
are estimated to judge the robustness of the price eﬀect under alternative speciﬁcations, such
as diﬀerent lagged relationships, ﬁrst diﬀerences, and error correction. The social beneﬁto f
pricing is illustrated in Section 5 using bank cost data and ﬁtted logistic S-curves to payment
use data for Norway and the Netherlands. A summary of our results and the public policy
issues they raise are discussed in Section 6.
2 Payment Composition, Pricing, and Other Inﬂuences
on Payment Instrument Use
2.1 Payment Composition
Both Norway and the Netherlands experienced a relatively rapid change in their payment
composition for point-of-sale and bill payment transactions over 1990-2004. Point-of-sale
instruments are now almost solely debit cards and cash but in the early 1990s checks were
also important. As seen in Table 1, the number of debit card transactions per person per
3Some ﬁxed fees do exist in the Netherlands. Debit card users pay a ﬂat annual average fee of 6 euros and
Internet banking has usually a one-time startup fee of around 15 euros.
4While check and credit card transactions are included in the analysis, check transactions are signiﬁcant
only in the early 1990s while there are few credit card payments in either country over the whole period.
3Table 1: Payment Instrument Use Per Person in Norway and the Netherlands
(1990-2004)
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 Growth Rate
Debit Card transactions
Norway 5 16 36 71 113 146 25%
N e t h e r l a n d s 1 42 44 46 67 7 3 3 %
ATM Cash Withdrawals
Norway 14 17 22 24 23 22 3%
Netherlands 8 20 26 28 30 28 9%
Electronic Giro (credit transfers + direct debits)
Norway 15 18 29 46 65 78 12%
Netherlands 44 54 70 93 116 124 7%
Paper Giro (credit transfers)
Norway 53 44 52 38 24 18 -7%
N e t h e r l a n d s3 43 23 32 72 11 8 - 5 %
Source: www.dnb.nl, DNB statistics, www.norgesbank.nl, Norges Bank Annual Report on Pay-
ment Systems.
year in Norway rose from 5 to 146 over our 15-year period, growing 25% per year.5 The
Netherlands started from a smaller base of 1 transaction per person per year but rose to 77, a
33% annual growth.6 Part of this diﬀerence is due to the fact that Norway started 1990 with
far more debit card terminals in place than the Netherlands and so was at a higher point of
usage on their logistic growth curve. In 2004, the average amount of a debit card transaction
was about €55 in Norway and €44 in the Netherlands.
No time-series data exists on the number of cash transactions, although a few (markedly)
diﬀerent estimates exist for some countries at diﬀerent points in time. These estimates diﬀer
primarily because of the diﬃculty of estimating very small value cash transactions in which
c o i n sa r eo f t e nu s e da n df o rw h i c hs t o r e dv a l u e cards—which are just starting to gain some
acceptance—are the only real substitute.7 We use the number of cash withdrawals at ATMs
as our indicator of cash use in transactions. Since average ATM withdrawals corrected
for price changes are fairly stable over time for both countries, our indicator—although not
5Oil company terminals and cards were introduced in the 1980s as a substitute for cash at gas stations.
Although these terminals also accepted bank debit cards, oil company cards could not be used elsewhere and
were not priced. The Norwegian payment statistics do not include oil company transactions as debit card
purchases (Norges Bank, 2000, p. 33) and neither do we. Oil company terminals are included in our series of
debit card terminals, however, since they accept debit cards for payment.
6Checks written per person in Norway went from 12 per person annually in 1990 to less than 1 in 2004.
In the Netherlands they went from 17 to zero. Credit card transactions per person in both countries were
less than 1 in 1990 and only 3 per person (Netherlands) to 5 (Norway) in 2004 (or about 3% of card use in
each country). The dominance of debit cards over credit cards is probably due to the fact that banks—not
the credit card companies—through a joint venture were the ﬁrst to introduce EFTPOS directly from deposit
accounts and have POS terminals connected to the bank network installed in shops. The banks’ purpose was
to replace checks with electronic cards at the point of sale but this also permitted a substitution away from
cash. Interestingly, Zinman (2004) develops a model of implicit costs to explain why debit cards are replacing
credit cards in the U.S.
7Brits and Winder (2005) provide an estimate of cash use in the Netherlands in 2002. Cash accounted for
85% of POS transactions and 56% of sales while debit cards comprised 13% of transactions and 40% of sales.
The average value of a cash transaction was around 10 euros but over 47 euros for debit cards in 2002.
4perfect—seems to be in reasonable correspondence with actual cash use.8 While each cash
withdrawal (€138 on average in Norway and €107 in the Netherlands in 2004) funds multiple
actual cash transactions, the act of withdrawing cash is priced in Norway while its use at the
point of sale is not. Thus we compare debit card and cash use at the point where both are
actually priced and consumer choice is exercised.9
In both Norway and the Netherlands, debit card use expanded at a rapid rate while
growth of ATM cash withdrawals was much smaller. As shown below, the average price of
an ATM withdrawal rose relative to a debit card transaction in Norway but these two prices
were both zero in the Netherlands. If relative price was the only inﬂuence on relative use, we
would expect a slower growth for ATM withdrawals in Norway (where the ATM price was,
after 1996, higher than debit cards) than in the Netherlands (where there is no diﬀerence in
relative prices). We see indications of thisf o rA T M si nT a b l e1( a sg r o w t hi nN o r w a yi s
slower than in the Netherlands) but we do not see it for debit card use (where the reverse
holds).
In order to reﬂect the substantially lower cost associated with electronic bill payments,
employee disbursements, and interbusiness transactions over giro networks, the price of an
electronic giro payment in Norway was less than a paper-initiated giro transaction (either
delivered in the mail or passed over the counter at a bank or postal oﬃce). Since giro prices
were zero in the Netherlands, one would expect to see a more rapid growth of electronic giro
transactions and slower growth (or greater reduction) of paper giro transactions in Norway
than in the Netherlands. Both of these expectations are realized in Table 1. Per person
use of electronic giro payments in Norway rose from 15 to 78 over 1990-2004 (growing 12% a
year) while only rising from 44 to 124 over the same period in the Netherlands (growing 7%
annually).10 At the same time, paper giro use fell in both countries but from a higher level
and at a greater rate in Norway. Indeed, by 2004 individuals in both countries initiated only
18 paper giro transactions per year.
2.2 Payment Prices in Norway
The average—and sometimes weighted average—per transaction prices being charged for dif-
ferent payment instruments in Norway are illustrated in Table 2. Since there are no per
transaction fees in the Netherlands, the relative prices that Norwegian consumers face also
reﬂect the diﬀerence in prices faced between Norway and the Netherlands. This is the price
eﬀect we wish to separate from other inﬂuences on payment choice in these two countries.11
The weighted average per transaction price of a cash withdrawal in Norway was, until
8In 2004 prices, the average real ATM withdrawal in Norway rose gradually from 127 euros in 1991 to 138
euros in 2004, while in the Netherlands it rose from 94 euros in 1991 to 107 euros in 2004. These ﬁgures imply
annual real growth rates of roughly 0.6 percent and 0.9 percent for Norway, respectively, the Netherlands.
9In reality, consumer payment choice is more complex. First, for an ATM there is the choice of whether to
withdraw or not, then second, at the point-of-sale whether to use “free” cash or a priced debit card. We leave
this “two-stage decision” issue aside in our analysis. Our view is that the use of cash at the point-of-sale will
be inﬂuenced by the cost of consumers’ replenishing their inventory of cash via an ATM (or other sources).
10By 2004, direct debits accounted for 10% of electronic giro payments in Norway but 56% in the Netherlands.
This is the main reason why electronic giro payments per person in the Netherlands are so much higher than
in Norway.
11Consumers in the Netherlands do face a ﬁxed annual fee for the use of a debit card but, as the fee is
ﬁxed, the consumer ”sees” a zero price per additional transaction and responds accordingly. However, below
transaction amounts of 10-12 euros, Dutch debit card users are sometimes confronted in some retail locations
with a charge of about 15 eurocents.
5Table 2: Average Per Transaction Prices for Diﬀerent Payment Instruments in
Norway
Prices in Euros 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 Growth Rate
Debit Card Price
Norway .18 .23 .25 .26 .28 .26 2%
ATM Cash Withdrawal Price
Norway .05 .18 .24 .29 .39 .40 14%
Relative Price: Debit Card/ATM Cash Withdrawal
3.60 1.28 1.04 .90 .72 .65 -11%
Electronic Giro Price
Norway .10 .18 .22 .23 .31 .27 7%
Paper Giro Price
Norway .35 .62 1.18 1.86 2.65 2.76 15%
Relative Price: Electronic Giro/Paper Giro
.29 .29 .20 .12 .11 .09 -8%
Source: www.dnb.nl, DNB statistics, www.norgesbank.nl, Norges Bank Annual Report on Pay-
ment Systems.
.
1996, less than that for debit cards.12 This was because a cash withdrawal at one’s own bank
was free during business hours and prices applied only to withdrawals after business hours or
at another bank’s ATM. While debit cards started out in 1990 with a price that was more
than three times higher than the weighted average of diﬀerent ATM prices (Row 3, Table 2),
it ended up being only 65% of the cash withdrawal price in 2004. Thus only after 1996 did the
absolute price of a debit card favor its use over cash when EFTPOS terminals were available.
But even before 1996, there was an indirect inducement to use debit cards in Norway when
it became possible in late 1992 to obtain “cash-back” from a debit card transaction at the
point of sale.13 This avoided the extra cost and inconvenience of having to use an ATM
to withdraw cash since small amounts of cash could be obtained at no additional cost when
making purchases at the local market.
There was a stronger relative price inducement to use an electronic rather than a paper-
initiated giro transaction for consumer bill payments. In 1990, the price of an electronic
giro transaction was only 29% as high as a paper giro payment but by 2004 this had fallen
to only 9% of the paper price. In the beginning, electronic giro payments were initiated via
telephone but this was later overtaken by the spread of Internet banking. This applies to
credit transfers where the consumer retains control in initiating a payment, as opposed to
a direct debit where the receiver of the credit initiates the debit to the consumer’s account
under a prearranged contractual agreement. In addition, it is noted that billers often give a
12This observation only holds on a per-transaction basis. On average one ATM withdrawal could fund
roughly 2 to 3 debit card transactions. However, since this diﬀerence in “transaction domain” between both
instruments is relatively stable over time, it should only aﬀect the intercept in our model in logs.
13Although cash-back transactions and cash at the counter at one’s own bank are also sources for obtaining
cash for free in Norway—and implicitly lower the eﬀective price for obtaining cash compared to our use of the
weighted average of free and priced ATM access—these data are available only for recent years and therefore
could not be included in the analysis.
6slight discount to customers that pay by direct debit, thus creating a price advantage over
an electronic giro. Due to lack of data, this relative price discount could not be taken into
consideration here.
It is important to note that the prices charged in Norway do not cover the full bank cost of
making a payment (c.f., Flatraaker and Robinson, 1995; Gresvik and Øwre, 2003). In 1988,
transaction prices covered only around 25% of the banks’ payment cost but this coverage had
risen to around 70% in 2001.14
2.3 Terminal Availability and Levels of Consumption
While relative prices provide an inducement to use electronic payments at the point of sale,
this can be accomplished only if a merchant has an EFTPOS terminal that can be used.
This observation points to the two-sided nature of the payment market which inﬂuences the
adoption rate of new payment instruments. In particular, the market for electronic payment
services is considered a two-sided market in the sense that both consumers and merchants
are needed simultaneously to demand and “consume” card payments. Suppliers of payment
card services (or so-called “platforms”) can eﬀectively cross-subsidize between merchants
and consumers through diﬀerential pricing to stimulate this demand. In two-sided markets,
typically only one side is charged on a transaction basis while the other side obtains the
service (almost) for free in order to generate greater demand.15 Indeed, merchants value a
wide diﬀusion of payment cards among consumers while consumers beneﬁt from high terminal
density at retail locations that accept their cards. In our analysis, payment card and ATM
terminal density are included to take this two-sided eﬀect into account in explaining relative
payment card usage.
Table 3 shows the number of EFTPOS terminals in place in Norway and the Netherlands
over 1990-2004 per one million of population (which controls for diﬀerences in population
size).16 A ss h o w ni nt h eﬁrst two rows, Norway had almost twice as many debit card
terminals as the Netherlands in 2004 and this diﬀerence was far more extreme in earlier
periods. While the growth of EFTPOS terminals has been more than twice as rapid in
the Netherlands, it still has a long way to go to provide the same density of terminal access
as Norway. By this measure alone, it really would not be possible—regardless of any price
incentive—for consumers in the Netherlands to use debit cards with the same intensity per
person as they do in Norway. As noted earlier, there is no price incentive to use debit cards
in the Netherlands so there are two reasons—no price incentive and fewer EFTPOS terminals
per person—to expect that the Netherlands would use debit cards less intensively than in
Norway. Even so, as shown below, it is diﬃcult to separate the eﬀect of prices from terminal
availability on debit card and ATM use.
The same “separation problem” exists for cash withdrawals at ATMs. Norway prices
ATM withdrawals while the Netherlands does not and for the entire period Norway also
provided a greater density of ATMs to withdraw cash from (Row 3, Table 3). Separating the
14The relationship between fees and underlying costs is diﬀerent in Sweden with surplus bank revenues
from card transactions cross-subsidizing the expense of providing cash, distorting resource allocation (Sveriges
Riksbank, 2004).
15In Norway, the consumer side is directly charged for its use of payment instruments while in the Nether-
lands the retailer side of the market pays per transaction. Bolt and Tieman (2004) provide an explanation
for these widely observed completely skewed pricing strategies in two-sided markets. See Rochet and Tirole
(2003) for a rigorous analysis of two-sided markets and competition.
16In 2004, the population in the Netherlands was 16.3 million; in Norway it was 4.6 million.
7Table 3: Terminal Availability, Real Consumption, and Demographic Inﬂuences on
Payment Instrument Use
1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2004 Growth Rate
Debit Card EFTPOS Terminals (per mil population)
Norway 2,487 6,324 8,932 13,214 17,723 21,091 15%
Netherlands 148 1,600 6,170 9,176 10,941 11,967 34%
ATM Terminals (per mil population)
Norway 419 396 426 451 484 473 0.8%
Netherlands 180 291 395 421 465 468 6.6%
Real Per Capita Personal Consumption (in 1000)
Norway 11.9 12.1 13.9 15.1 17.8 16.7 2.3%
Netherlands 9.2 9.3 9.9 10.9 11.4 11.3 1.4%
Share of Young Adults in Population
Norway 8.0 7.8 7.2 6.4 6.0 6.0 -1.9%
Netherlands 8.5 8.2 7.0 6.1 6.0 6.0 -2.3%
Source: www.dnb.nl, DNB statistics,National Accounts, Dutch CBS, www.norgesbank.nl, Norges
Bank Annual Report on Payment Systems, IFS.
price eﬀect from the terminal eﬀect for ATM cash withdrawals may be somewhat easier here
since by 2004 both countries had almost the same ATM density but withdrawals were priced
only in Norway and, compared to the Netherlands after 1993, per person use in Norway was
correspondingly less (Row 3, Table 1).17
Inferences on the relative importance of pricing may be more accurate if two other possible,
but small, inﬂuences on payment choice are considered. One concerns diﬀerences in the level
of real per capita personal consumption between the two countries, since higher levels of real
consumption tend to be associated with larger numbers of transactions.18 As e c o n di n ﬂuence
concerns the possibility that changes in the number of young adults in both countries may
aﬀect diﬀerences in new payment adoption rates. Consumer surveys indicate that young
adults and higher income individuals adopt new payment arrangements more rapidly than
others even without pricing. But direct pricing could well aﬀect the adoption rates of those
with greater habit persistence, a lower opportunity cost, or who do not value much the added
convenience or security that electronic payments can oﬀer.
The level and variation of both per capita consumption and the share of young adults
in the population over time are illustrated in the bottom half of Table 3. Real per capita
consumption in Norway was 29% greater than that in the Netherlands in 1990 but rose to be
17As Norway is roughly nine times larger than the Netherlands, diﬀerences in population density may
compromise the usefulness of our availability measure of ATM and EFTPOS terminals. However, both
countries are highly urbanized which is probably the most important driver for installing terminals. In
Norway, the ﬁve largest cities account for about 25% of total population but for only 1% of total geographic
area (see Norway Statistics, www.ssb.no). Less extreme, in the Netherlands, the 10 largest cities make up
roughly 20% of Dutch population with 3.5% of the area (see CBS statistics, www.cbs.nl.). Since this diﬀerence
in densities is eﬀectively a constant over 15 years, in our log-diﬀerence equation its impact would aﬀect only
the intercept and not the slope parameter, which is our terminal elasticity.
18All monetary values for Norway (prices as well as real consumption) have been translated from Norwegian
kroner into euros using a purchasing power parity exchange rate. Also, real per capita consumption in Norway
includes oil revenues only indirectly as some of this revenue is used to ﬁnance government expenditures which
likely reduces taxes from what they would otherwise be, permitting real consumption to be larger.
848% higher in 2004. This diﬀerence should be associated with a rising number of all types
of transactions in Norway relative to the Netherlands. There are smaller diﬀerences between
these two countries in the shares of young adults—new entrants into the labor force aged 20
to 24. Indeed, these shares are falling in both countries.19
3 A Country-Diﬀerence Model of Payment Choice
3.1 A Country-Diﬀerence Model
Diﬀerences between Norway and the Netherlands are used to try to explain per capita use of
debit cards, ATM cash withdrawals, and electronic and paper giro payments. As outlined
above, the main inﬂuences on payment use and composition are diﬀerences in the number
of EFTPOS and ATM terminals per million population, the prices being charged in Norway
(positive) and the Netherlands (zero), and diﬀerences in the level of real per capita consump-
tion. Our time period is short (only 15 years) as time-series data on payment instrument use
has only recently been deemed important enough to be routinely collected at the country level
by government agencies. While some time-series on some payment types do exist for longer
periods in some countries, this information is not comprehensive nor are payment instrument
prices available since very few types of payment services are directly priced. Norway is
the exception that allows us to undertake this analysis. These data constraints impose a
parsimonious speciﬁcation on our explanatory four-equation model:




+ α23CARDTERMINALt−1 ∗ CARDPRICEt
+ α4CONSUMPTIONt + ε1t
(1)




+ β23ATMTERMINALt−1 ∗ CARDPRICEt
+ β4CONSUMPTIONt + ε2t
(2)
EGIROt = γ1 + γ2EGIROPRICEt +1 /2(γ22EGIROPRICE2
t )
+ γ3CONSUMPTIONt + ε3t
(3)
PGIROt = δ1 + δ2EGIROPRICEt +1 /2(δ22EGIROPRICE2
t )
+ δ3CONSUMPTIONt + ε4t.
(4)
In the variable deﬁnitions, NOR indicates Norway and NL indicates Netherlands and
diﬀerences between these countries are expressed in index form:20
19Demographic variables are typically extremely smooth series. In implementation, these variables created
convergence problems in our system estimations and were deleted.
20In many cases, the log of the absolute diﬀerence in our variables between countries was negative (or changed
from positive to negative) so all variables are expressed as the log of the ratio or index of the diﬀerence between
countries.
9CARD = ln (NOR debit card use/NL debit card use),
on a per person basis;
CARDTERMINAL = ln (NOR card terminals/NL card terminals),
per million population;
CARDPRICE = ln (NOR card price/NOR ATM price);
CONSUMPTION = ln (NOR personal consumption/NL personal consumption,
real per capita;
ATM = ln (NOR ATM cash withdrawals/NL ATM cash withdrawals),
per person;
ATMTERMINAL = ln (NOR ATM terminals/NL ATM terminals),
per million population;
EGIRO = ln (NOR electronic giro use/NL electronic giro use),
per person;
EGIROPRICE = ln (NOR electronic giro price/NOR paper giro price);
PGIRO = ln (NOR paper giro use/NL paper giro use),
per person.
Since debit card and ATM terminals have to be in place before consumers can use them,
and even when in place typically have a lag before they are used at a signiﬁcant level, these
two terminal variables are lagged by one year in the model to give a closer correspondence
between the exogenous availability of new terminals and their possible eﬀect on use. Prices,
o fc o u r s e ,a l s oh a v et ob ek n o w nb e f o r et h e yc a na ﬀect payment choice. The lag here is likely
much shorter and prices are speciﬁed as exogenous and contemporaneous.21
Looking at the data, it appears that the two countries diﬀer in when they introduced
electronic payment instruments. In the Netherlands, usage of the electronic giro was on
a higher level than in Norway in 1990 whereas Norway had a higher density of ATM and
EFTPOS terminals. This “starting value” problem is taken into account in our logarithmic
speciﬁcation through the intercept which is not restricted to a value of 1 (which would imply
equal starting values for 1990).
3.2 Illustrating the Determinants of Payment Composition
While our model looks diﬀerent from the usual demand equation speciﬁcation used to estimate
price eﬀects on payment instrument use in a single country (c.f., Humphrey, Kim, and Vale,
2001), the same variables—quantity of use, levels of own price, substitute price, and income
(via consumption)—are included in the analysis. Ideally, we would like to run an experiment
where there are no price inducements to aﬀe c tc o n s u m e rc h o i c eo fp a y m e n ti n s t r u m e n t si n
a country, observe the rate of adoption of electronic payments based solely on non-price
considerations along with terminal availability (if required), and then re-run the experiment
adding price inducements in order to separate price from non-price eﬀects. This would
address the omitted variable problem of unknown non-price attributes of diﬀerent payment
instruments.22 Our use of two countries—one with pricing, one without—addresses the non-
price attribute omitted variable problem if country diﬀerences in non-price attributes are
relatively small, as seems likely. In any case, we also estimate the eﬀect of pricing in one
21The eﬀects of diﬀerent lag arrangements on the results are noted in Section 4.
22For example, if an electronic payment instrument oﬀers signiﬁcant convenience or security beneﬁts com-
pared to its paper-based alternative, then pricing the paper instrument higher than its electronic alternative
would likely generate a larger price response than if such non-price attributes did not exist.
10country (Norway) below but are aware that these results may incorporate unknown non-price
attributes.
The observed relationships underlying our four-equation model are illustrated in the two
ﬁgures below. In Figure 1, the price of debit cards in Norway is steadily falling relative
to the weighted average price actually incurred for an ATM cash withdrawal over 1990-2004
(line with circles). Although the relative price of debit cards was falling, the absolute price
was higher than a weighted average of ATM cash withdrawal prices up until 1996 (Table 2).
Thus it is not surprising that relative debit card use in Norway compared to the Netherlands
was falling (as seen in the top line with boxes) up until 1997. After 1996-97, the absolute
price of debit cards in Norway was less than an ATM cash withdrawal and debit card use
in Norway expanded slightly faster than in the Netherlands (which did not have this price
inducement).23 While a falling relative price is expected to promote use, this apparently
occurred only when the price of a debit card transaction was absolutely less than an ATM
withdrawal. Overall, the pattern of debit card and ATM prices in Norway reduced debit
card use relative to the Netherlands up to 1996 and expanded it slightly afterward (shown
as a slight rise in the top line with boxes after 1996). Thus we should not expect a strong
price elasticity response for debit card use. And, indeed, the response we obtain is weak.
The situation for ATMs is essentially the reverse. The average ATM price is lower than
that for debit cards in Norway over 1990-1996 so ATM use in Norway may be expected to
exceed that in the Netherlands where these prices are the same (both at zero). But ATM
use in Norway expands at a slower rate than in the Netherlands up until 1995 (as the bottom
line with boxes falls over this period). After 1998 when the debit card price is absolutely
lower than the ATM price, Norwegian ATM use falls slightly relative to the Netherlands.
Consumer choice seems to be aﬀected by absolute prices as well as changes in relative prices.
For debit cards as well as ATMs, use seems to closely follow the availability of terminals
needed for these transactions. This implies a positive relationship. As shown below, however,
ATM terminal availability appears to have gotten ahead of terminal use in both countries
toward the end of our period, leading to a negative relationship where terminals expand but
use falls.
The price-use relationship for electronic and paper giro transactions seems clearer, per-
haps because there are no “terminal constraints” and likely weaker non-price attributes to
potentially confound the eﬀect of prices on relative giro use.24 In Figure 2, the price of an
electronic giro transaction in Norway falls relative to paper only after 1993 (line with circles).
Importantly, and unlike the debit card to ATM price relationship, the electronic giro price is
always absolutely lower than the paper price in Norway. Thus use of electronic giro payments
in Norway is seen to rise relative to that in the Netherlands over the whole period (bottom
line with boxes) while the relative use of paper giros falls—although only slightly—after 1995
(top line with boxes). The relationships illustrated in Figure 2 indicate that the relative
level of payment prices, as well as the change in relative prices over time, is important in
determining relative payment use for giro payments. The same holds for debit card and
ATM use in Figure 1.
23This is where the ratio of the debit card to ATM price equaled one so the log of this value (the line with
circles) was at zero in the ﬁgure. The curves in all ﬁgures are cubic splines of plotted actual observations.
24While an Internet connection is needed for consumers to make an electronic credit transfer, this is not
needed for a direct debit. As well, the number of Internet connections far exceeds the number of Internet
banking users so an Internet connection does not act as a binding “access constraint” in the same manner as
a debit card or ATM terminal. Obviously, the same holds for telephone connections and telephone giros.
11Figure 1: Debit Card Use, Prices, and Terminal Availability
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4 Estimation Results and the Eﬀe c to fP r i c eo nP a y m e n tI n -
strument Use
The system of equations (1) to (4) was estimated in a seemingly unrelated regression frame-
work to allow for the possible correlation between errors in locally identifying debit card use
with those for ATM cash withdrawals and similarly for electronic and paper giro use. The
estimated parameters and their associated t-statistics are shown in the Data Appendix. With
15 observations per equation, there are 38 degrees of freedom (d.f. = 4*15 - 22). As expected
from viewing Figures 1 and 2, the explanatory power of the model was high (the respective
R2s were .98, .99, .87, and .80 from the system estimation). While the variables are not I(0)
and only infrequently bivariately cointegrated, the Durbin-Watson statistics suggest no seri-
ous positive autocorrelation of residuals (the D-W values were, respectively, 2.12, 2.80, 1.86,
and 2.03). This is conﬁrmed by analyzing the estimation results using ﬁrst diﬀerenced data
as well as an error correction speciﬁcation. In addition, the relationships shown in the ﬁgures
appear to be reasonable and expected from theory so the degree of spurious correlation, if
any, is likely to be small. We feel that these ﬁndings support the results of our preferred
model using levels data. Naturally, given the small sample size, any strict interpretation of
the estimated elasticities needs to be accompanied by suﬃcient caution.
4.1 The Eﬀect of Price on Payment Use
The derivatives of equations (1) to (4) with respect ﬁrst to relative prices and then with
respect to lagged terminal availability are shown in Column 1 of Table 4 (and they are all
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero). A 10% reduction in the price of debit cards relative to an
12Figure 2: Electronic and Paper Giro Use and Prices
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ATM cash withdrawal is associated with a 2.2% rise in the relative use of cards in Norway
compared to the Netherlands (which has a zero explicit price for both cards and ATMs). At
the same time, a 10% increase in debit card terminals in Norway relative to the Netherlands
is associated with a 5.3% rise in debit card use in Norway relative to the Netherlands. As
seen in the table, lagging both terminals and prices by one period doubles the strength of
the price response (from -.22 to -.48) but does not alter the terminal elasticity. Assuming no
lags, however, increases considerably the apparent responsiveness of debit card use to changes
in terminal availability—making it almost one-to-one in percentage terms—but the trade-oﬀ is
to generate a price elasticity insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Over 1990-2004, the price of ATMs in Norway rose relative to debit cards. The price
elasticity suggests that a 10% rise in the relative price of ATMs is associated with a 2.3%
decrease in relative use.25 Numerically, this is very similar to the result for the debit card
equation where a 10% reduction in the relative price of debit cards gives a 2.2% rise in relative
use.26 The ATM terminal elasticity, however, has an unexpected sign and is negative at its
mean. When evaluated yearly, the terminal elasticity is positive over 1990-1994 but the
negative relationship for the remaining years dominates, giving a negative mean. Looking
more closely at ATM use and terminal availability (Tables 1 and 3) suggests that the source
of the negative elasticity is that per person ATM use in Norway reaches a peak in 1998 and
then falls while ATM availability in Norway reaches a peak ﬁve years later in 2003. Similarly,
ATM use in the Netherlands peaks in 2001 but terminals continue to expand. The apparent
25Since the price ratio used in the ATM equation is the same as that used in the debit card equation—ln
(Norway debit card price/Norway ATM price)—the negative debit card price elasticity would become a positive
elasticity in the ATM equation.
26The ATM price eﬀect is larger when both terminals and prices are lagged in the model.
13Table 4: Price and Terminal Elasticities Under Diﬀerent Model Speciﬁcations
Lagged Lagged Terminals No Lags Separate Prices
Terminals and Prices Own Substitute
Debit Card
Price Eﬀect -.22* -.48* -.06 -.19 -.03
Terminal Eﬀect .53* .57* .94* .49*
ATM Cash Withdrawal
Price Eﬀect .23* .31* .29* -.85* .69*
Terminal Eﬀect -.16* -.49* -.35* -.35*
Electronic Giro
Price Eﬀect -.46* -.53* -.44 .21* .10*
Paper Giro
Price Eﬀect .27* .25* .33* -.03 .03
Starred (*) values indicate a P-value smaller than .01 in a two-tailed t test.
explanation for the negative ATM terminal elasticity is that ATM use has reached saturation
(due in part to the price disincentive) while terminals are still being added, giving the result
that terminals are expanding while use is falling.
The estimated price eﬀects for electronic and paper giro payments conform to expectations
since, when the relative price of electronic giro transactions falls 10%, relative use of this
instrument in Norway rises 4.6% compared to the Netherlands. Similarly, a 10% increase in
the relative price of paper giro payments is associated with a 2.7% reduction in relative use
between the two countries.27 Our preferred model in equations (1) to (4) was respeciﬁed
so that direct debits, which comprise 10% of electronic giro payments in Norway but 56% in
the Netherlands, were deleted from the electronic giro use and price data. This had almost
no eﬀect on the results shown in Column 1 of Table 4. Equations (1) to (4) were respeciﬁed
again to include checks with ATMs so that both can substitute with debit cards. Checks
were important in the early 1990s, had a high price, and their use eﬀectively fell to zero
by 2004. Nothing of substance was changed except that the debit card price elasticity lost
signiﬁcance.
Real per capita personal consumption was markedly higher in Norway and growing faster
than in the Netherlands. We expected that this would have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on
expanding relative electronic payment use in Norway. However, as seen in the Data Appendix
where the parameter results are shown, the eﬀect of real per capita personal consumption on
payment use was insigniﬁcant in all four equations.
Just as an exercise, equations (1) to (4) were simpliﬁed by deleting the squared terminal,
squared price, and terminal-price interaction variables. Then the remaining price ratio in
each equation (e.g., debit card price/ATM price and electronic giro price/paper giro price)
was reexpressed as the log of separate own and substitute price variables for each equation.
The resulting own and substitute price elasticities, along with the reestimated terminal eﬀect,
are shown in the last two columns of Table 4. Our preferred model (in Column 1) is speciﬁed
in ratio form, due to our limited sample, but it is of interest to see the implied own and cross-
27Since the same price ratio is used in both the electronic and paper giro equations—ln (Norway electronic
giro price/Norway paper giro price), the negative electronic giro price elasticity would become a positive
elasticity in the paper giro equation.
14price elasticities that result from estimating each price elasticity separately. All but one
own price elasticity is negative and three of the four cross-price elasticities are positive (as
would be expected for a substitute payment instrument). However, considering that only
one negative own elasticity and two positive cross elasticities were signiﬁcant, it seems that
the price eﬀects are not very strong.
An earlier study of the eﬀects of payment instrument pricing in Norway over 1989-1995
found signiﬁcant and inelastic own price elasticities for debit cards (-.35) and ATM cash
withdrawals (-.55) along with signiﬁcant substitution between debit cards and ATMs which
ranged from -.11 to -.46 (see Humphrey, Kim, and Vale, 2001). Although this study did not
control for terminal availability as we do, the results obtained do not greatly diﬀer from ours.
In both studies, own price elasticities are all inelastic and debit cards signiﬁcantly substitute
for ATM cash withdrawals with an elasticity less than .50.
4.2 An Error Correction Speciﬁcation
Although our model is speciﬁed in log-diﬀerences between Norway and the Netherlands, the
variables used in our system estimation are non-stationary. As the estimation results may be
biased and could reﬂect spurious correlations, our model was reestimated in ﬁrst diﬀerence
and error-correction forms. The model in levels, in ﬁrst diﬀerences, or in error correction
form are all nested within an “autoregressive distributed lag” framework. The imposed
restrictions in this framework are linear and easily tested.
To illustrate, consider the following extension of equation (1), written in an autoregressive
distributed lag regression format by adding lagged endogenous and exogenous variables:28
CARDt = α + γCARDt−1 + δ1CARDPRICEt + δ2CARDPRICEt−1 (5)
+ β1CARDTERMINALt−1 + β2CARDTERMINALt−2 + ut.
The simultaneous restrictions γ = β2 = δ2 =0b r i n gu sb a c kt oam o d e ls p e c i ﬁed in (current)
levels only. Without aﬀecting its ability to explain the data or changing the least squares
estimates of the parameters of interest, (5) may be rewritten as:
∆CARDt = α +( γ − 1)CARDt−1 + β1∆CARDTERMINALt−1
+( β1 + β2)CARDTERMINALt−2 + δ1∆CARDPRICEt (6)
+( δ1 + δ2)CARDPRICEt−1 + ut.
Imposing the simultaneous restrictions γ =1 , β1+β2 =0 ,a n dδ1+δ2 =0generates a model
speciﬁcation in ﬁrst diﬀerences that can be tested using a Wald test.
Alternatively, (5) may be rewritten in error correction form:
∆CARDt = α + β1∆CARDTERMINALt−1 + δ1∆CARDPRICEt
+( γ − 1)(CARDt−1 − λ1CARDTERMINALt−2 (7)
− λ2CARDPRICEt−1)+ut,
28Note that compared to equation (1), the squared variables, interaction terms, and consumption have been
excluded. These additional variables could be included without aﬀecting our illustration.
15where λ1 =
β1+β2
γ−1 and λ2 = δ1+δ2
γ−1 .
If the parameter γ1−1 is negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, the model in error
correction format cannot be rejected. In (7) we have an equilibrium relationship:
∆CARDt = α + β1∆CARDTERMINALt−1 + δ1∆CARDPRICEt + ut,
and an equilibrium error,
CARDt−1 − λ1CARDTERMINALt−2 − λ2CARDPRICEt−1,
that measures the extent to which the long-run relationship between the variables CARDt−1,
CARDTERMINALt−2 and CARDPRICEt−1 is not satisﬁed. Consequently, the feedback
parameter γ − 1 can be interpreted as the proportion of the resulting disequilibrium that
is reﬂected in the movement of CARDt in one period. If speciﬁed in logarithms, the pa-
rameters λ1 and λ2 yield estimates of long-run elasticities that would be equivalent to the
price and terminal elasticities we derived from equations (1) to (4) if our model in levels is
appropriate. Interestingly, error correction models are also appropriate when the variables
are non-stationary and are particularly attractive when the dependent variable is I(1). Gen-
erally, the signiﬁcance of the parameter γ−1 indicates the existence of a long-run equilibrium
and the cointegration of the non-stationary variables.29 This would allow direct estimation
of our preferred model in levels.
The error correction results of all four equations are shown in Table 5 along with the price
and terminal elasticities for our preferred model from Table 1 using levels data along with
new elasticities using only ﬁrst diﬀerenced data. In a ﬁrst diﬀerence framework both terminal
elasticities have the expected sign and are signiﬁcant, but this is at the expense of poor results
for the price elasticities. In the error correction form, the debit card price elasticity is no
longer signiﬁcant but the other price elasticities have the expected sign and are signiﬁcant
(even with a reduction in degrees of freedom), although in two cases the feedback parameter
was not signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Given our data limitations, the results weakly suggest
that the price elasticities using levels data in equations (1) to (4)—our preferred model—are
r o b u s ta n dc a nb er e l i e du p o na sl o n g - r u ne s t i m a t e s .
4.3 Estimation of Electronic for Paper Substitution in Norway
The eﬀect of pricing on payment instrument use is also estimated for Norway alone. This
approach should give similar results to our country diﬀerence model if non-price characteris-
tics that aﬀect payment use in a country are not too strong. The speciﬁcation is linear and
simpler than our country diﬀerence model (due to degrees of freedom considerations) and all
the data are for Norway:
CARDATMt = α1 + α2CARDATMTERMINALt−1 (8)
+ α3CARDATMPRICEt + α4CONSUMPTIONt + ε1t
ELEPAPERt = β1 + β2ELEPAPERPRICEt + β3CONSUMPTIONt +  2t (9)
29As a stability condition, the feedback parameter γ − 1 n e e d st ob eb e t w e e nz e r oa n d- 1 .
16Table 5: Price and Terminal Elasticities: Data in Levels and First Diﬀerences
Levels 1st Diﬀerenced 1st Diﬀerenced & Levels Data
Data Data in an Error Correction Model
Debit Card
Price Eﬀect -.22* .47 3.25
Terminal Eﬀect .53* .75* .82
Feedback Parameter -.066
ATM Cash Withdrawal
Price Eﬀect .23* .06 .32*
Terminal Eﬀect -.16* .47* -.39*
Feedback Parameter -.826*
Electronic Giro
Price Eﬀect -.46* .37* -.60*
Feedback Parameter -.240
Paper Giro
Price Eﬀect .27* .11 .49*
Feedback Parameter -.448*
Starred (*) values indicate a P-value smaller than .01 in a two-tailed t test.
Debit cards and ATMs formed one system estimation while electronic and paper giros formed
another in the ﬁrst diﬀerenced and error correction models.
where:
CARDATM = ln (debit card use/ATM use),
on a per person basis;
CARDATMTERMINAL = ln (card terminals/ATM terminals),
per million population;
CARDATMPRICE = ln (debit card price/ATM price);
CONSUMPTION = ln (personal consumption),
real per capita;
ELEPAPER = ln (electronic giro use/paper giro use),
per person;
ELEPAPERPRICE = ln (electronic giro price/paper giro price).
Equations (8) and (9) were estimated in a systems equation framework (with 23 degrees
of freedom, d.f. = 2*15 - 7). As shown in Table 6, the elasticity of substitution between
debit cards and cash was -.20 using levels data and -.31 in ﬁrst diﬀerences. A 10% rise
in the relative price of an ATM cash withdrawal (which reduces the ratio of debit card to
ATM prices) is associated with a small (2.0% or 3.1%) rise in the ratio of debit card to ATM
use. If this parameter was -1.0, then the expenditure shares of debit cards and ATMs would
be unchanged since a 10% relative rise in the ATM price would be exactly oﬀset by a 10%
decrease in relative ATM use. Since the parameter is less than one (in absolute value), the
expenditure share of ATMs rises as the price-induced substitution is less responsive than in
(say) a traditional Cobb-Douglas framework where the elasticity of input substitution to a
price change is 1.0. The elasticity of terminal availability on debit card and ATM use is .54
which indicates that a 10% relative rise in debit card terminals leads to a 5.4% relative rise
in debit card use.
17Table 6: Price and Terminal Substitution for Norway
Debit Card/ATM substitution:
Levels Data 1st Diﬀerenced Data
Price Eﬀect -.20* -.31*
Terminal Eﬀect .54* .06
Electronic/Paper Giro Substitution:
Price Eﬀect .54* .13
Starred (*) values indicate a P-value smaller than .01 in a two-tailed t test.
The substitution elasticity between electronic and paper giro transactions had the wrong
sign (at .54) and was signiﬁcant using levels data in a system estimation. Use of ﬁrst
diﬀerenced data did not alter this sign but dropping real personal consumption from (8)
and (9), which had a large and signiﬁcant eﬀect, did (giving a signiﬁcant -1.98 value for
electronic/paper giro substitution).
4.4 Conclusions Regarding the Eﬀect of Pricing on Payment Use
Three conclusions can be drawn from our price elasticity results so far. First, in Table
4 and in our alternative speciﬁcation here, the eﬀect of terminal availability on relative
debit card and ATM use exceeds that for pricing since the terminal elasticities are larger.
This implies that convenience, safety, and other non-price attributes of diﬀerent payment
instruments are themselves an important inducement to change payment use, as long as
terminals are available, than is price. Even so, pricing does have a signiﬁcant eﬀect in
inﬂuencing payment choice but not as much as we had expected. A second conclusion,
which follows in part from the ﬁrst, is that changes in relative prices (or terminals) both
have a smaller than proportional eﬀe c to nr e l a t i v eu s e . I nt h i ss e n s e ,b o t he ﬀects are
relatively inelastic. Third, the similarity of the price elasticity results from our country
diﬀerence model with those for debit card/ATM substitution in Norway alone suggests that
the omitted variable of unspeciﬁed non-price payment instrument attributes is not strong
enough to markedly distort price elasticity results derived from a single-country estimation.
Although approximate, our overall conclusion is that while terminal availability appears
to have a stronger eﬀect on relative payment instrument use than does direct per transaction
pricing, the shift to electronic payments could be speeded up when pricing is combined with
terminal availability.30 If both prices and terminals are expanded at similar percentage
rates then the adoption of electronic payments could have been speeded up by perhaps 40%
compared to not having per transaction pricing.31 As seen in Tables 2 and 3, however, debit
card terminals changed at a much greater rate than did the price of ATMs or the relative
prices of cards to ATMs, indicating that in this instance a potential speedup of 40% is too
high and was not realized.
More precisely, for Norway the average annual growth in debit card terminal density
equaled +15%, whereas the growth in card price relative to ATMs was -11%. Given the
estimated elasticities in Table 4, this would predict a relative rise of debit card use over ATMs
30Dutch survey results conﬁrm the relative importance of terminal availability for payment instrument usage
and stress also the non-price attributes of payment instruments (e.g. , in the adoption of stored-value cards,
see Jonker, 2005).
31This estimate is derived from the ratio of the price elasticity in our preferred model (-22%) in Column 1
of Table 4 to the terminal elasticity (53%), which equals .42.
18of 15 × 0.53% + 11 × 0.22% = 10.4% from the terminal and price eﬀects alone. Without
any price inducements this increase in usage would be 15 × 0.53% = 8.0%, suggesting that
the substitution process has been speeded up by approximately 2.4/10.4 = 23%, although
the realized contribution of pricing to debit card adoption was 2.4% a year.32 Electronic
giro payments do not have a terminal constraint and the inﬂuence of consumption growth
on payment use is not signiﬁcant so only the eﬀect of pricing is measured. The growth of
electronic giro relative to paper giro prices was -8% while the price elasticity in Table 4 was
.46, suggesting that the realized contribution of pricing to the adoption of electronic giro
payments was 8 × 0.46% = 3.7% annually. Thus in terms of both the size of the estimated
price elasticities and their realized impact on adoption rates, the eﬀect of pricing on the
shift to electronic payments is greater for giro transactions than for debit cards. The fact
that terminal elasticities are an important component of the substitution process for cards
suggests that non-priced attributes—such as convenience and security—play a greater role for
cards versus cash than for electronic versus paper giro transactions.
5 Illustrating the Social Beneﬁto fE l e c t r o n i cP a y m e n t s
Logistic or “S-curves” have been successfully used to approximate the adoption and dispersion
of new products and technology, such as the adoption of the telephone, the television, the
Internet, and the use of robots in manufacturing. This procedure is applied here to electronic
payments since, during our 15-year period, the shares of debit cards (in total debit card and
ATM transactions) and electronic giros (in electronic plus paper giro payments) made the
transition from rising at an increasing rate to rising at a decreasing rate (c.f., Table 7).33
Over 1990-2004, the average change in debit card shares at 4 percentage points per year
in both countries suggests that per transaction pricing of debit card and ATM transactions
in Norway did not appear to speed up the adoption of cards. If it had, we would expect
to see a larger average share change for Norway than for the Netherlands (rather than the
reverse seen in Table 7). This result is essentially consistent with the low estimated price
elasticities for debit cards compared to electronic giros seen in Tables 4 and 5.34
The smaller change in electronic giro shares for the Netherlands compared to Norway
implies that pricing giro transactions has speeded up the transition to electronics. For giro
transactions, the relative price of paper giros was rising but, in addition, the electronic price
was absolutely lower than the paper price. Although the relative price of ATM transactions
was also rising over our sample period, the debit card price was absolutely higher than the
ATM price for the beginning one-third of our sample. While economists maintain that only
changes in relative prices matter, common sense suggests that consumers are also inﬂuenced
by absolute prices. Our data show a falling relative price of debit cards over the whole period
but, if the debit card price had remained above the weighted average of an ATM transaction
for the entire period as well, it is very unlikely that many consumers would have chosen to
use a debit card unless the non-price attributes were very strong.
32The same calculation using price (-.20) and terminal (.54) elasticities for Norway alone from Table 6 gives
a 20% speedup for debit card use (with a contribution of 2.2% annually).
33The coverage of an inﬂection point for electronic giros in the Netherlands is weak, however.
34Indeed, replacing the dependent variables in equations (1) to (4) with the index of shares, rather than the
index of per person use, reverses the sign for the debit card price elasticity and gives an insigniﬁcant paper
giro price eﬀect. With the index of shares—ln [(Norway share electronic/share paper)/(Netherlands share
electronic/share paper)] the price eﬀects are weaker than those we identiﬁed earlier.
19Table 7: Debit Card and Electronic Giro Payment Shares in Norway and the
Netherlands
Debit Card Electronic Giro
Norway Netherlands Norway Netherlands
1990 .27 .12 .22 .56
1995 .58 .39 .34 .67
2000 .78 .63 .60 .80
2004 .87 .73 .82 .87
Percentage point change in share per year:
4 4.1 4 2.1
Payment shares are debit card use/(debit card + ATM use) and electronic giro use/(electronic +
paper giro use).
Since inﬂection points are covered in the data series, logistic S-curves were estimated and
are shown in Figures 3 and 4.35 The S-curves are from: ln(St/(1 − St)=a + bT +  t where
St = the share of electronic payments in total electronic and paper transactions, T = time,
and b is the slope of the S-curve. This form imposes symmetry around the inﬂection point
in the data and assumes that electronic payments will, at some point in time, completely
replace their paper-based alternative. This is more likely for electronic versus paper giro
transactions than it is for debit cards and cash, unless stored-value cards become popular
and replace cash use.36 The ﬁt to the observed data can be assessed by the extent to which
the data points over 1990-2004 deviate from the solid curves in the ﬁgures.37 All the other
data points in the ﬁgures are predicted shares from a ﬁtted logistic curve.
An alternative way to judge the eﬀect of pricing payment services is to compare the
slopes of the estimated S-curves. For debit cards in Figure 3, b = .197 for Norway while b =
.249 and is higher for the Netherlands, suggesting a more rapid adoption rate. While this
diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant at the .05 (but not .01) level, it is not very important
economically (as seen visually from the ﬁgure and noted in Table 7 where the yearly average
change in shares is shown). For electronic giro transactions in Figure 4, the diﬀerence in
slopes is greater (b =.202 for Norway, b = .126 for the Netherlands) and this diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant at the .01 level, as can be inferred simply by looking at the graph.38 From a
public policy perspective, this suggests that consumer valuation of the convenience, security,
and other non-price beneﬁts of debit card use is important and that pricing—given the relative
prices being charged—has likely had only a relatively small incremental impact on the trade-oﬀ
between debit card use versus obtaining cash from an ATM. In contrast, pricing appears
to make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the adoption rate of electronic giro transactions. This is
consistent with the larger price elasticities usually estimated for electronic giros compared to
35Comparing S-curves for Norway and the Netherlands illustrates the “starting value” problem again, which
we also encountered in estimating the model.
36A non-linear, symmetric, logistic curve speciﬁcation exists that can impose an upper limit (say S
∗
t = .90)t o
the replacement of ATM cash withdrawals by debit cards using lnSt = S
∗
t /(1+cexp(−bT))+ t. Unfortunately,
we were unable to obtain convergence when this model was estimated.
37The adjusted R
2s ranged from .91 to .99. Meade and Islam (1995) have shown that the standard logistic
c u r v ew eu s e( a l o n gw i t ha n o t h e rs i m p l es p e c i ﬁcation) outperforms more complicated models. This is largely
because allowing for non-linearity and/or asymmetry around the inﬂection point asks too much of the limited
data typically available.
38Assuming the two S-curves are independent, since they refer to diﬀerent countries, the means test for Figure
3w a s :t =( .249 − .197)/
s
(.021)2 +( .006)2 =2 .38 and was t =( .202 − .126)/
s
(.010)2 +( .006)2 =6 .52 for
Figure 4.
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The discounted social beneﬁt of electronic payments can be approximated by considering
the diﬀerence in the bank cost of producing electronic versus paper payments (Row 1 of
Table 8) and the speed by which a country shifts to electronic payments (determined, as an
approximation, from Figures 3 and 4).39 The per transaction bank cost ﬁgures used here
are for Norway but are very similar to those for the Netherlands. As the time taken to shift
from paper to electronics diﬀered across countries and payment instruments, we computed
beneﬁts using a common number of years (40). We started when the share of electronics
was .10 and ended when it reached .90, to eliminate the slow start and ﬁnish evident in the
ﬁtted S-curves which are farther from our observation set. Once a .90 share was attained,
the undiscounted nominal beneﬁts remained at that level until the end of the 40-year period.
Beneﬁts are computed using the level of payments in 1999, noted in the footnote to the table,
since we do not have information on what that level was before 1990 nor after 2004. The
annual per person beneﬁts were discounted at 3% and sums of the per person discounted (and
undiscounted) beneﬁts are shown in Table 8. Shifting to debit cards from ATMs apparently
saves €9 4 5p e rp e r s o ni nN o r w a ya n d€769 in the Netherlands while the shift to electronic
from paper giro payments saves €814 and €881 per person, respectively, in the two countries.
Factoring in the savings from eliminating checks adds €461 and €676 in savings per person
in Norway and the Netherlands, discounted over the same 40-year period.40 Overall, the
39Savings in merchant costs are typically unknown but, if estimated, should be included (taking care not to
double count certain expenses, such as including bank fees in merchant costs). Some merchant cost savings
information does exist for point-of-sale transactions in the Netherlands but no information exists for merchant
savings for giro payments (Brits and Winder, 2005).
40Bank check costs per transaction were 2.70 euros while debit card expenses were .30 euros. This gives a
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apparent discounted savings in bank costs per person from electronic payments is €2,220 in
Norway and €2,326 in the Netherlands. If the switch to electronic payments took place
immediately rather than over a 40-year horizon, the total savings would be €0.7 billion for
all of Norway (.35% of GDP in 2004) and €2.9 billion for all of the Netherlands (.61% of
GDP).41
6 Summary and Conclusions
Electronic payment instruments (credit cards excepted) are considerably cheaper than their
paper-based alternatives, including cash. Banks and merchants are interested in shifting
users to electronic payments to save costs, as are some government policy makers who seek
net savings of 2.40 euros for each of the 11.8 (Norway) and 17.3 (Netherlands) checks written per person in
1990 that were fully replaced by debit cards by 2004. Had the net savings per check been the same as the
cost diﬀe r e n c eb e t w e e nd e b i tc a r d sa n dA T M s( 1 . 0 1e u r o s-. 3 0e u r o s=. 7 1e u r o s ) ,t h e nt h ev a l u e ss h o w ni n
Table 8 would already include the check savings. Since the check savings are larger, the additional savings
from checks for each year is 2.40 euros - .71 euros = 1.69 euros times the per person check numbers above
times 40 years and then discounted at 3%. This gives the discounted sums reported for checks in the text.
41Multiplying the estimated cost diﬀerence for debit cards and ATMs in Norway and the Netherlands (.71
euros) by the number of total debit card and ATM transactions per person in 1999 (95 and 72, respectively)
and then by the population of each country (4.6 and 16.3 million, respectively) gives the cost savings estimate
if debit cards immediately replaced ATMs. The cost diﬀerence for debit cards and checks is 2.40 euros and
the respective number of transactions in 1990 was 11.8 and 17.3 checks per person. The cost diﬀerence of
electronic versus paper giro payments was .69 euros while the respective number of transactions was 84 and
120 per person in 1999. These values, plus GDP, were used to compute the estimated savings in the text.
Including merchant cost savings would raise these values.
22Table 8: Estimated Per Person Beneﬁt from Electronic Payments (all values are in
euros)
Debit Card vs. ATM Electronic vs. Paper Giro
Norway Netherlands Norway Netherlands
Cost Diﬀerence 1.01 - .30 1.01 - .30 1.39 - .70 1.39 - .70
Undiscounted 1,907 1,533 1,644 1,835
Discounted 945 769 814 881
Per person debit card + ATM transactions in 1999 were 95 per year in Norway and 72 in
the Netherlands while electronic + paper giro transactions were, respectively, 84 and 120.
to improve the cost eﬃciency of their nation’s payment system. Historically, banks have
recouped their payment costs through: (1) interest earned on payment ﬂoat (from delaying
availability of funds credited to accounts and debiting accounts prior to bill payment value
dates); (2) maintaining a spread between market rates and the rate paid on deposits; and (3)
charging ﬂat monthly fees or imposing balance requirements. In contrast to business users,
consumers face very few payment services that are priced on a per transaction basis and so
have little incentive to choose the lowest cost instrument either at the point of sale or for bill
payments.
Banks are well aware that transaction pricing can speed up the shift to electronic payments
but are reluctant to lose deposit market share by being the ﬁrst (and perhaps only) bank to
implement explicit prices diﬀerentiated according to underlying costs. While this problem
is mitigated if most (or all) banks implement pricing at about the same time, antitrust
authorities are unlikely to view such coordination as being in the public interest unless the
social beneﬁts from pricing are signiﬁcant and the quid pro quo is a compensating reduction
in payment ﬂoat, a higher interest rate paid on deposits, or a reduction in ﬂat fees or balance
requirements. Indeed, ﬂoat reduction was the trade-oﬀ when banks coordinated the timing
of when they would implement pricing in Norway (there was no coordination in the prices to
be charged and initially some were zero).
In this paper we use the experience of Norway (which priced its payment services) and
the Netherlands (which did not) over 1990-2004 to try to determine what the incremental
eﬀect of transaction pricing may be on the adoption of debit cards versus withdrawing cash
from an ATM and on the adoption of electronic giro transactions (credit transfers and direct
debits) over paper giros. Speciﬁcally, we compare payment instrument use per person in
Norway in response to the prices being charged, the availability of terminals, and the level
of real consumption with the experience of the Netherlands which also adopted electronic
payments but did not price. Our four-equation country diﬀerence model spanned 15 years—
the limit of the available data—and during this time the share of electronic payments rose
by some 60 percentage points, from around the mid-twenties to the mid-eighties which in
most cases easily covered the inﬂection point where the share of electronic payments switches
from rising at an increasing rate to rising at a decreasing rate. Our model is estimated in
a systems equation framework using levels data and robustness is illustrated by estimating
models in a ﬁrst diﬀerence and error correction framework. Price and terminal elasticities
derived from these models form the basis for our conclusions and indicate the incremental
eﬀect of pricing on the adoption rate of electronic payments. We also attempt to estimate
the social beneﬁt of shifting to electronic payments and oﬀer guidance on how pricing may
best be implemented.
23The eﬀects of pricing diﬀer depending on which instruments are being considered. Over-
all, pricing has a smaller eﬀect on shifting consumers from ATM cash withdrawals to debit
card use than it does in shifting use from paper to electronic giro transactions. The reason
for this diﬀerence seems to be that there are non-price beneﬁts associated with debit card use
(convenience, security) that consumers value such that the availability of terminals needed
for debit card transactions has a stronger eﬀect on debit card use than prices, as evidenced
by the fact that the debit card price elasticity is smaller than the terminal elasticity. Debit
cards also substitute for costly checks and the high price on these instruments in Norway was
associated with their virtual elimination, although the same thing happened in the Nether-
lands which did not price. While terminal availability appears to have a stronger eﬀect
on debit card use than does pricing, the shift to cards can be speeded up when pricing is
combined with terminal availability. Using our estimated elasticities and the actual changes
in prices and terminals, the predicted relative rise of debit card use over ATMs was 8.0%
from terminal eﬀects alone but rose to 10.4% with pricing, an increase of around 20%.
The eﬀect of pricing on electronic giro use was greater than it was for debit cards since
the electronic giro price elasticity is larger and the percent change in price experienced was
greater. Reasons for this diﬀerence are the above-mentioned non-price convenience and
security attributes of debit cards along with the fact that for one-third of our time period the
absolute price of a debit card transaction was higher than the weighted average price of an
ATM cash withdrawal. In contrast, the price of an electronic giro was always absolutely lower
than the paper giro price. Even though the relative prices of debit cards and electronic giros
were both falling over the entire period, the higher absolute price of a debit card transaction
versus an ATM would be expected to dull the overall price response being measured for the
entire period since there is no strong reason to believe that the price response is symmetric
(and symmetry was not imposed in our model) since the non-price attributes of debit cards
and ATMs are diﬀerent. Thus if pricing is implemented, it will likely be more successful if
the absolute price of the less expensive instrument is always absolutely lower per transaction
than the price of the more expensive instrument.42
In terms of cost savings, the shift from ATM cash withdrawals and checks to debit cards
plus the savings from shifting from paper to electronic giro transactions—if it happened with-
out a lag—may save €0.7 billion in bank costs for Norway (.35% of GDP in 2004) and €2.9
billion for the Netherlands (.61% of GDP).43 Merchant cost savings, for which little infor-
mation exists, would increase these savings estimates as would viewing the discounted bank
cost savings over a 40-year transition period (and is noted in the text). As both of these
countries are well on their way to realizing the full potential gains from electronic payments,
the issue of pricing or not pricing is a policy topic for developed countries that are not as
far along in the substitution process or for most developing countries that are just in the
initial stages of thinking about how to improve the eﬃciency of their payments system. The
social beneﬁts of electronic payments are quite large and may convince antitrust authorities
to allow the coordination of the timing of the implementation of pricing (but not of course
the prices to be charged) to speed up this transition if banks wished to adopt explicit pricing.
And with interest rate margins falling, worsening the recoupment of bank payment costs, this
wish may soon become a reality.
42This was not done in Norway, perhaps because dispensing cash via an ATM was already less expensive
than dispensing it through a branch oﬃce (assuming the rise in dispensing frequency at an ATM does not rise
enough to oﬀset this advantage).
43The savings are absolutely higher for the Netherlands primarily because its population (16.3 million) is
much larger than that of Norway (4.6 million), but GDP per capita is lower.
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258 Data Appendix.
Parameter estimates and t-statistics are shown below for the system estimation of equations
(1) to (4). Standard errors were computed from a heteroscedastic-consistent matrix (Robust-
White).44
Variable Parameter Estimation T-statistic
Constant α1 .497961 2.77398
DIFDCARDTML α2 .373649 2.55827
DIFDCARDPRICE α3 .055702 .180209
DIFDCARDTML2 α22 .167924 1.24453
DIFDCARDPRICE2 α33 .870318 1.21951
DCARDTMLPRICE α23 -.308628 -.922949
DIFPCONS α4 -.571509 -1.13726
Constant β1 .035974 .554554
DIFATMTML β2 -1.67562 -8.56053
DIFDCARDPRICE β3 1.00388 5.85276
DIFATMTML2 β22 5.93594 7.78129
DIFDCARDPRICE2 β33 2.33231 3.40630
ATMTMLPRICE β23 -3.15162 -4.50450
DIFPCONS β4 -.138567 -.766170
Constant γ1 -.519080 -1.21248
DIFEGIROPRICE γ2 1.06886 2.15115
DIFEGIROPRICE2 γ22 .881313 3.06231
DIFPCONS γ3 .544589 1.13520
Constant δ1 -.606181 -1.20153
DIFEGIROPRICE δ2 -1.69478 -2.90182
DIFEGIROPRICE2 δ22 -1.13584 -3.30711
DIFPCONS δ3 -.678980 -1.34759
Debit Card equation (1): R2 = .978, Durbin-Watson = 2.12
ATM Cash Withdrawal equation (2): R2 = .987, Durbin-Watson = 2.80
Electronic Giro equation (3): R2 = .872, Durbin-Watson = 1.86
Paper Giro equation (4): R2 = .802, Durbin-Watson = 2.03
Data description and sources:
The Netherlands:
Source: DNB Statistics (www.dnb.nl), CBS Statistics (www.cbs.nl) and National Accounts
statistics.
44Our data computations follow a translog type of approach where squared values of variables are computed
as (ln X)
2 rather than ln (X
2) and interaction variables are (ln X)(ln Y) rather than ln (XY). Consequently,




t−1 rather than ln (X
2)t−ln (X
2)t−1 and interaction variables
are (ln X)(ln Y)t−(ln X)(ln Y)t−1 rather than ln (XY)t−ln (XY)t−1. The two approaches give similar but
not identical results.
26Debit card transactions include goods purchased with domestic debit cards; credit card usage
(of about 3% of total card usage) is not included. Debit card terminals are EFTPOS terminals
at the point-of-sale in retail locations. ATM cash withdrawal transactions include only
withdrawals with domestic debit cards. ATM terminals are owned by Dutch commercial
banks. Paper-based giro transactions include ordinary credit transfers (“mail giro”) and
inpayment transfers (“accept-giro”). Electronic giro transactions include credit transfers,
standing order credit transfers and direct debits.
Consumption is derived from national accounts data on ﬁnal private consumption expendi-
tures, per capita, and corrected for inﬂation using CPI data. Demographic data are con-
structed using data from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics.
Norway:
Source: Norges Bank (www.norgesbank.no), Norges Bank Annual Report on Payment Sys-
tems (2004, 2000, 1997), Statistics Norway (www.ssb.no), and International Finance Statistics
database.
Debit card transactions include goods purchased with Norwegian payment cards in Norway
and abroad but does not include use of oil company cards (see footnote 4 in the text). Debit
card terminals are EFTPOS terminals that also include terminals owned by oil companies
(since all debit cards can be used). ATM cash withdrawal transactions include withdrawals
from commercial banks and savings banks. These banks own the ATM terminals. Debit card
price relates to the bank per transaction price for payment cards using an EFTPOS terminal.
ATM withdrawal price is a weighted price for a cash withdrawal, based on observed prices
and volume weights corresponding to withdrawals at a bank’s own ATM terminals during
opening hours and outside of opening hours, and other banks’ ATM terminals during opening
hours and outside of opening hours. Paper-based giro transactions include mail giro, giro
for cash payments, account debits, and money orders. Electronic giro transactions include
company terminal giros, giro via Internet or telephone, credit transfers, and direct debits.
Paper-based giro price is a weighted price per transaction using observed prices and volume
weights corresponding to mail giro, giro for cash payments, account debits, and money orders.
Electronic giro price is a weighted price per transaction using observed prices and volume
weights for terminal giro, Internet giro, telephone giro, and direct debits.
Consumption is derived from IFS data on ﬁnal private consumption expenditures, per capita,
and corrected for inﬂation using CPI data. All nominal values and prices are converted into
euros using a purchasing power parity exchange rate published by Norges Bank. Demographic
data are constructed using data from Statistics Norway.
Some missing values at the beginning of the sample were estimated by applying simple ex-
trapolation procedures.
27